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Abstract (150 words) 
 
The Victorians are often held up as giants in civil engineering, able to build, span and 
tunnel in ways that had never been seen before, and which still provide much of our 
contemporary infrastructure.  Their legacy can be easily seen in the railway networks of 
Great Britain, which demanded some of the most difficult and challenging civil 
engineering ever seen.  As a consequence of such endeavors, Victorian times also saw 
the emergence of the ‘celebrity’ engineer.  Stellar figures who first experienced the shift 
away from technical and site-based practices and moved instead towards the 
management and leadership of construction works, a professional legacy that arguably 
remains today.  Such figures also served to further anonymise the construction workers 
or Navvies, who were already working in dangerous and unhealthy conditions on projects 
where loss of life was felt to be inevitable.  Unpacking Victorian railway tunneling 
operations duly acknowledges the spectacular feats of engineering we have inherited 
from them, but also reveals how their legacy has also contributed to the ways in which we 
mobilise tunneling operations today.  It is argued that such contributions should be 
recognised and consciously re-balanced if we are to take the next steps to improve 
tunneling operations within the profession of civil engineering today. 
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1.0 Introduction 1 
Following the feats of the Georgian civil engineers as they developed the canal network and its 2 
many tunnels across Britain (Edmondson et al 2017), came the mighty Victorians.  Amongst the 3 
Victorian civil engineers are such luminaries as Rawlinson, Stephenson and Brunel, all of whom 4 
brought their professional expertise to bear on the considerable volumes of construction work 5 
undertaken during this era, and particularly the rapid growth in steam railways with the need for 6 
railway tunnels.  In this paper, we explore the way the Victorian engineers looked to their work, 7 
we unpack how changes and developments of engineering practice during this time created 8 
new challenges for the profession, and we seek to illuminate how we can best recognise the 9 
learning legacy to help advance the practice of deep tunnelling operations today. 10 
 11 
2.0 Railway Tunnelling in Victorian Britain 12 
By the end of Queen Victoria’s reign in 1901 the British Empire extended over one fifth of the 13 
world, whilst in England industrialisation and development continued apace.  This was the age 14 
of steam, and the thriving years of railway construction were the 1840s, a time of dramatic and 15 
great change, with Parliament authorising approximately 8,000 miles of new line (refer to Figure 16 
 1).  By the end of the age, Victorian civil engineers had constructed a total of 215 Railway 17 
tunnels (Blower 1964) on the arterial routes of the country, through a variety of different 18 
landscapes and facing many different challenges. 19 
 20 
INSERT FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE 21 
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Most of the early railways constructed in Victorian Britain (1837 to 1901) had problems with their 22 
tunnels.  At the very start of Victorian era, in February 1837, work on the 24 feet wide, 1930 23 
yard long Watford Tunnel was finally substantially completed (refer to Figure 2). Constructed on 24 
the London to Birmingham Railway by Chief Engineer Robert Stephenson (1803 to 1859), a 25 
railway line costing at the time more than £5,000,000 (Lecount, 1839), (for comparison, during 26 
the era a labourer earned around 48d or old pence per day (Simm, 1896, p401)) the tunnel was 27 
required to avoid the estates of Lords Essex and Clarendon.  An account of the Watford 28 
tunnelling work in Household Words (1856), an English weekly magazine edited by Charles 29 
Dickens, describes the likely scene as work progressed (Refer to Box 1).  30 
 31 
Box 1: A  Retrospective Account of Work Progressing at Watford Tunnel Appearing in 32 
Household Words (1856) 33 
 34 
‘There was no day there and no peace: the shrill roar of escaping steam; the groans of mighty 
engines heaving ponderous loads of earth to the surface; the click-clack of lesser engines pumping 
dry the numerous springs by which the drift was intersected; the reverberating thunder of the small 
blasts of powder fired upon the mining works; the rumble of trains of trucks; the clatter of horses’ 
feet; the clank of chains; the strain of cordage; and a myriad of other sounds, accordant and 
discordant.  There were to be seen miners from Cornwall, drift-borers from Wales, pitmen from 
Staffordshire and Northumberland, engineers from Yorkshire and Lancashire, navvies — 
Englishmen, Scotchmen, and Irishmen — from everywhere, muck-shifters, pickmen, barrowmen, 
brakes-men, banksmen, drivers, gaffers, gangers, carpenters, bricklayers, labourers, and boys of 
all sorts, ages and sizes; some engaged upon the inverts beneath the rails, some upon the drains 
below these, some upon the extension of the drifts, some clearing away the falling earth, some 
loading it upon the trucks, some working like bees in cells building up the tunnel sides, some upon 
the centre turning the great arches, some stretched upon their backs putting the key-bricks to the 
crown — all speaking in a hundred dialects, with dangers known and unknown impending on every 
side; with commands and countermands echoing about through air murky with the smoke and 
flame of burning tar-barrels, cressets, and torches.  Such was the interior of Watford tunnel.” 
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The Watford Tunnel was constructed through a soft chalk formation covered with overlying 35 
gravel. Simms (1896) reports that the chalk was deeply fissured, with fissures at times 36 
extending to a depth in excess of 100 feet.  These fissures were filled with gravel, and the 37 
workers boring the tunnel encountered running gravels and sands, which would ‘rush down with 38 
such violence as to plough the sides of the tunnel as if bullets had shot against it’ (Simms, 1896 39 
p202). On the 17th July 1835 in Russell Wood, Levesdon Green (close to Watford), such an 40 
incident occurred at the base of a 90 foot, newly sunk ‘gin-shaft’ or header shaft . A team of five 41 
brick-layers and six labourers were completing the brick lining for the new shaft when it is 42 
believed that a member of the gang ‘loosened a portion of the wood work previous to bricking 43 
the shaft’ (Anon, 1835) and triggered a sudden in rush of gravel and sand.  The men in the 44 
shaft, named as ‘Thomas Jordan, Joseph Barker, Thomas Evans, Silvanus Rudings, John Brett, 45 
William Byard, Thomas Windmill, James Darvell and Barlett Jeans’ (Anon, 1835) were buried 46 
alive 80 feet below the surface of the earth. It took a month for the bodies to be removed from 47 
the shaft by a team of labourers working 12hour back-to-back shift patterns.  During the inquest 48 
that followed the cause of death of the men was found by the jury to be accidental. John 49 
Cropper the sub-contractor under Messrs Hardy and Copeland responsible for all the brickwork, 50 
is reported in the Buckinghamshire Herald (1835) as stating he ‘had never been told the shaft 51 
was unsafe, and he never believe it to be so’.  Robert Stephenson the Chief Engineer in the 52 
same report is reputed to have stated that ‘he directed in all cases in which danger was feared 53 
from the presence of sand that six feet and four feet lengths be worked.  Mr Buck, the Resident 54 
Engineer, had unlimited power as to any expenses necessary to render the work safe’, but sadly 55 
this power had not been exercised in practice. 56 
 57 
INSERT FIGURE 2 NEAR HERE 58 
 59 
Just over four years after the completion of Watford Tunnel, in March 1841, Thomas Longridge 60 
Gooch (1808 to 1882) completed the Summit Tunnel connecting Littleborough with Walsden in 61 
West Yorkshire (Robbins, 1984, p62). Passing beneath the Pennines on the Manchester to 62 
Leeds line at depths of between 200 to 400 feet, the 2869-yard long tunnel was, upon opening, 63 
the longest rail tunnel in Britain. Sources indicate that it took between 2 years four months and 64 
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three and a half years to construct (Robbins, 1984, p62; Anon, 1851, p20).  The tunnel was 65 
constructed through shale, coal and sandstone, by a workforce comprising of on average 1000 66 
men, 13 stationary steam engines working at the head of the shafts, and 130 horses.  ‘About 70 67 
houses were erected by the company for dwellings for the work-people, who also built for 68 
themselves about 100 huts on the Summit above the tunnel’ (Anon, 1851, p20) The tunnel 69 
which was 24 feet at its widest point, was constructed by boring outwards from 14 shafts, and 70 
finished with a lining of six courses of brick set with Roman cement. Upon completion, the final 71 
arch was romantically described in a contemporary source the Parliamentary Gazetteer of 72 
England and Wales (1851, p19) - ‘Amidst the piles of crags, whose face and form have been 73 
altered by the labours of man and the blasting of gun powder, rises a fine and massive arch of 74 
masonry’ (refer to Figure 3). In 1840, during construction the invert of the tunnel is reputed to 75 
have suffered a stability problem and gave way at a belt of blue shale.  Although available 76 
accounts from the period do not record any casualties arising from this specific incident, during 77 
the construction of the tunnel somewhere between 28 and 41 lives are reported to have been 78 
lost (Higson, 1991; Simmons and Biddle, 2003), the variation in figures reflective of a lack of 79 
robust records from the time. 80 
 81 
INSERT FIGURE 3 NEAR HERE  82 
 83 
One month after the completion of the Summit Tunnel, in April 1841 Isambard Kingdom Brunel 84 
(1806 to 1859) completed construction of the 3123 yard long Box Tunnel.  Situated on the line 85 
of the Great Western Railway between Swindon and Bath, this tunnel cut through oolite rock, 86 
forest marble and lias marl (refer to Figure 4).  Simms (1896, p199) reports that ‘eleven principal 87 
shafts, 25 feet in diameter, and four intermediate shafts, 12 feet 6 inches, were sunk for the 88 
purpose of carrying on the works of the tunnel, they averaged 200 yards apart’. The geological 89 
conditions encountered during construction led to water ingress into the tunnel through rock 90 
fissures.   91 
 92 
INSERT FIGURE 4 NEAR HERE 93 
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Between November 1837 and July 1838, work on the tunnel was suspended as water ingress 94 
exceeded expected volumes, filling the then complete section of the tunnel and backing up the 95 
access shafts to a height of 56 feet. A second steam pump was deployed to reduce the water 96 
level, but the difficulties encountered in the ground led to tunnelling work being behind 97 
programme.  In November 1841, Brunel increased the construction workforce from 1000 to 98 
4000 workers. The workers operated by candlelight, with the shafts acting as the only egress 99 
and ingress for all materials, spoil and the workforce in an emergency.  Given the logistics and 100 
time taken to get such numbers of workers in and out of the tunnel, blasting generally occurred 101 
with the workers still in the tunnel.  This management approach, coupled with water ingress 102 
caused 100 workers to lose their lives during the construction of this tunnel (Buchanan, 2003), a 103 
man for every 31.23 yards. 104 
 105 
The collective works of Charles Dickens, whose first serial was published in 1836, the year 106 
before Queen Victoria succeeded to the throne, characterise the Victorian era as one of 107 
destitution and need, particularly for workers.  Loss of life was, as the preceding accounts 108 
indicate, a frequent occurrence in construction work and in the grounds of Kirby Lonsdale 109 
Church there is a poignant example of this: a grave stone erected to a young man known by the 110 
name of John Smith, supposed to be a native of Italy, who was drowned in the River Lune 111 
August 28th 1869 aged 19 years (refer to Figure 5).  The stone was erected by his fellow 112 
workmen as a token of their respect, with a telling epitaph, ‘Be ye also ready. Matt. 24, 44’.   113 
 114 
There were some attempts at support for the workers, frequently known as Navvies, ve nmade 115 
at the time, however these were not always as philanthropic as they perhaps seem.  For 116 
example, to assist with sickness as well as occasional accidents, Sick Funds could be 117 
established.  However these were funded by the workers themselves, required to make a 118 
mandatory weekly payment and therefore making such funds essentially a tax on their own 119 
wellbeing. Such a mechanism also gave no incentive for engineers and managers to avoid 120 
incidents and accidents, as the costs of such events were essentially borne by the workers 121 
themselves. One such fund was established for Blechingley Tunnel, a 1327 yard long tunnel, 122 
completed in 1842 by Resident Engineer F.W.Simms.  Simms includes a copy of the Sick Fund 123 
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rules and regulations in the 1844 addition of his text ‘Practical Tunnelling’ (refer to Box 2).  The 124 
fund amongst other provision allowed a worker to receive twelve shillings per week for 6 weeks, 125 
and then half pay for the following three weeks; where a worker had been injured during a 126 
tunnelling accident half pay was extended by a further 3 weeks.  If a worker suffered death then 127 
funds would be paid in lieu to his representatives to assist with the necessary funeral costs.  128 
 129 
INSERT BOX 2 NEAR HERE 130 
INSERT FIGURE 5 NEAR HERE 131 
In his guide to ‘Practical Tunnelling’ published in 1896, Simms devotes a chapter to ‘Casualties 132 
in Tunnelling’, which are attributed to ‘arise chiefly form the presence of water, quick sand or 133 
treacherous materials’.  Notably, the descriptions of the casualties prepared by Simms in this 134 
account refer principally to the tunnel structures themselves, and make only limited reference to 135 
casualties amongst workers. The Sick Fund remedy was only able to make simple redress for 136 
worker injury, injury to engineering reputations and the costs for project delays was perhaps not 137 
so easily obfuscated and so merited prioritisation. 138 
 139 
3.0 The Discourses of Victorian Civil Engineering 140 
The Victorian civil engineers of the railways remain stellar figures in their field, their names 141 
carved deeply into the walls of the ICE’s One Great George Street home.  And perhaps this is 142 
rightly so; these men were able to meet the many engineering challenges of creating an 143 
infrastructure that would support Britain through the industrial revolution, enabling economic 144 
growth and prosperity that spread her empire far and wide.  Yet this emergence of the Victorian 145 
civil engineering ‘celebrity’ also shaped the industry in ways that were ultimately deleterious to 146 
worker safety, and to an extent, this shape remains with us today: we have a more nuanced 147 
legacy to consider, and here two aspects are examined in depth.  Firstly, we look at the rise of 148 
the engineering celebrity, and how it contributed to the continued anonymisation of the 149 
construction workers, which in turn led to their continued ill treatment. Secondly, the increases 150 
and changes in the pressures and challenges of such ‘celebrity’ roles, on the scale at which 151 
they fell to such men, also led to changes in construction management practice. 152 
 153 
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Firstly to consider the workers, the Navvies, those who actually built the railways with their 154 
muscles, their sweat and, all too frequently, their blood.  In contrast to the many statues and 155 
carvings commemorating the Engineers, the lives and deaths of the railway Navvies were rarely 156 
recorded, or even reported.  The work of Coleman (1965) is a notable exception that brings 157 
together myriad primary reports from contemporary times (see Ness 2009 for a more detailed 158 
examination of the ‘invisible construction worker’ and its repercussions for present-day practice).  159 
Yet as works of Dickens (2018) informs us, it must be recognised this was simply characteristic 160 
of the Victorian age.  For example, in 1844, when arguments around health and safety 161 
legislation for factory and mill-based industries was both prominent and consistent in the House 162 
of Commons, construction was not even considered as an industry that could be improved.  163 
Rather, people were simply expected to die on construction projects, and if they became a 164 
construction worker they would readily accept that risk as part of their trade: ‘There was not a 165 
great building erected, a new Reform Club, or new House of Parliament in this city, that did not 166 
occasion fatal accidents; but no one argued from that that men should not become carpenters 167 
or masons’ (Warburton, HC Deb 18 March 1844 vol 73 cc1173-267).  When railway construction 168 
is specifically explored, reference to the safety or wellbeing of the Navvies or other railway 169 
construction workers is most notable by its absence.  Instead, concern remains with the railway 170 
workers, those operating the railway systems, which were ‘…the worst of all, the loss of life and 171 
injuries among the railway servants in all the operations connected with shunting, it amounts to 172 
a national scandal… The real point is, whether the accidents which do occur can be prevented?’ 173 
(Channing, HC Deb 19 May 1886 vol 305 cc1440-65).  Whilst concern for those operating and 174 
using the railways was an ongoing subject of debate in the houses of parliament, the prevention 175 
of accidents during their construction simply does not emerge as a subject worthy of 176 
consideration. 177 
 178 
This same discourse permeates the records of the engineers themselves.  For example Thomas 179 
Longridge Gooch in his memoirs (1879) makes no mention of workers or worker fatalities, 180 
although operational incidents are acknowledged including the first passenger railway fatality of 181 
Mr Huskisson on the opening of the Liverpool and Manchester railway on the 15th September 182 
1830.  Coleman reports that Brunel, when shown a list of 131 Navvies who had been 183 
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hospitalised for serious injury on his Great Western Line, simply said ‘I think it is a small list, 184 
considering the very heavy works’ (1965, p66) and that the project had involved so many men 185 
for so many years.  Coleman (1965, p31) also states that ‘Railway engineers rarely kept any 186 
count of the men killed.  Even Robert Rawlinson of the London and Birmingham, one of the 187 
most humane of engineers, said he did not…’  This was simply the way the construction of the 188 
railways was understood and accepted at the time, and by those who had a close and 189 
immediate relationship to it: it was customary to ignore the Navvies, as if railways built 190 
themselves (Coleman 1965, p31). 191 
 192 
Whilst the acknowledgement and recognition of such worker sacrifices has changed over the 193 
years, the shift in the dominant discourse has perhaps been slower and less significant than we 194 
would like to admit to ourselves today.  Indeed, only ten years ago in the UK more than one 195 
person died per week working in construction (the figure was 77 fatalities, Health and Safety 196 
Executive 2007), and rarely were such incidents reported beyond the local press.  Moreover, the 197 
reasons and explanations for such accidents can also echo from the times of the Navvies, who 198 
‘increased the ever-present hazard by their own recklessness’ and ‘bravado’ (Coleman 1965, 199 
p64) as a contributory discourse of ‘blaming the worker’ for their own incidents also emerged, 200 
and which arguably remains with us today (Frederick and Lessin 2000).  For example, Barlow 201 
(1889) justified 13 fatalities on the construction of the New Tay Bridge as being ‘due in almost 202 
every case to the individual recklessness of the men themselves’ (1889) rather than any 203 
responsibility of his father who designed it, or himself, as Resident Engineer on the project. 204 
 205 
Yet, to draw on the second dominant discourse of the time, which concerns the growing roles 206 
and responsibilities undertaken by the Victorian Engineers, an understanding of, if not 207 
forgiveness for, such attitudes and practices towards the workers can perhaps be made, and 208 
indeed may better help us understand practices today.  To look to the diaries of Gooch (from 209 
1825 onwards), the legacy of the Georgian Engineers can still be seen in the amount of time he 210 
spent ‘on the line’ as an engineer, carrying out levelling and surveying and being there on his 211 
project.  However, he began (from 1829 onwards) to start to spend some of his days ‘in the 212 
office’ with duties such as preparing bills, estimates, making plans, measuring work, and making 213 
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pay on a fortnightly basis becoming more familiar entries in his diaries.  As his celebrity 214 
increased, so did the managerial demands made on him as an engineer, as evidenced by his 215 
recollections of the Manchester and Leeds (M&L) Railway (Gooch 1879). 216 
 217 
His involvement in this formidable project started with the considerable efforts needed to get the 218 
Bill through parliament, which clearly demonstrates the influence of both that body, and other 219 
interests, in large infrastructure construction that also remains today.  In 1830 ‘the Bill was lost; 220 
for the Canal interest, at that time, was very strong and powerful; and Committees of the 221 
Houses of Parliament were so open (his emphasis) to Members, that their decisions were 222 
influenced mainly by canvassing, many voting who had never heard the evidence.’  When the 223 
Bill did pass in 1835 following amendment, it was ‘having to be adopted in great part in 1835 224 
entirely from a lack of time to make any further examination’, and although the reasons for this 225 
lack of time are unclear, the lack of detail, information and even an accurate survey at the 226 
initiation of a project is perhaps another all-too familiar legacy from this time, and one unlikely to 227 
deliver project success. 228 
 229 
Despite his satisfaction and interest in the profession of engineering, rather than enabling 230 
Gooch to focus on his self-proclaimed enjoyment of Geology, his development and progression 231 
as an engineer found him instead directed into more managerial pursuits.  This included the 232 
management of the twenty four Engineering Districts that were set out along the M&L line, the 233 
success of which Gooch positions in terms of their financial resolution: ‘…all of which with 2 234 
exceptions were satisfactorily wound up and settled by myself – and those two exceptions were 235 
readily adjusted by reference to Mr Robert Stephenson as Arbitrator’.  Whilst Gooch does 236 
acknowledge the daily necessities of construction work, for example noting that the ‘the average 237 
progress at each face while Tunnel in operation may be stated at 7 ½ inches a day of 24 hours.  238 
The maximum progress at a face having been about 21 inches per day of 24 hours’ this remains 239 
very much a discourse of production and progress, and Gooch seeks to praise the setting-out of 240 
his fellow engineers rather than the Navvies that put it into practice.  Indeed, as found in the 241 
work of Simms, any concern regarding injury is that of a legal nature, ‘The Canal and Turnpike 242 
Road interest being very hostile, the greatest care was needful to avoid injury to them’ as they 243 
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sought to sue and gain from the project as it progressed.  And Gooch was certainly not unaware 244 
of this shift in his profession: ‘I have often felt and said that, throughout the whole period of 245 
executing this Line, the legal difficulties occupied as much of the thought, attention and time of 246 
the Engineers as the physical; greatly embarrassing for our proceedings and adding to the 247 
expense (his emphasis)’.  Gooch also positions the financial rewards for the successful 248 
completion of this project as significant, ‘with bonuses of £250 paid: upon the satisfactory 249 
completion of the contracts under their superintendence respectively; provided that the same be 250 
ready for the passage of the Trains, on or before the last day of November next...’ firmly placing 251 
time and cost together within the success of engineering practice.  Gooch himself was also not 252 
immune to such incentive schemes, with ‘one Thousand pounds be presented to Mr T L Gooch 253 
upon the completion of the Line’.  Yet whilst his reflections on this project, one of the most 254 
significant of his career, highlight the good work of his fellow engineers, Stephenson, the 255 
company directors and their solicitors, no mention is made at all of the workers who carried it 256 
out. 257 
Following Gooch’s success on the M&L Railway, he was in considerable demand, and as such 258 
his engineering practice became dominated by the preparation of plans for new bills, the 259 
evaluating of new projects for both colleagues and parliament, and in contractual and arbitration 260 
work.  Like other ‘celebrity’ engineers of the time, he also made himself ill from the hours he was 261 
working, ‘the chief inconvenience I felt from the excessive night and day work on these 262 
occasions was a considerable swelling in and pain in the ancles (sic).’  And he was not a 263 
wholehearted supporter of the Victorian ‘Railway Mania’ and was scathing of many ‘projects of 264 
the most reckless character were brought forward in Parliament, and how many useless ones 265 
were sanctioned by that inefficient tribunal; a large number of them, happily, were afterwards 266 
abandoned.’ 267 
 268 
The Gooch he presents through his writings is a man happy to style himself as one of the 269 
celebrity engineers of the Victorian age: ‘I knew I was going to undertake a most difficult work in 270 
the Manchester and Leeds Railway, one which our opponents used to declare could never be 271 
executed.’  Such positioning is perhaps vulnerable to failure itself, indeed Gooch fails to mention 272 
the Summit Tunnel collapse at all within his memoirs, despite the significant loss of life incurred.  273 
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His words instead reveal a prioritisation of project management (legal and contractual) and 274 
money over buildability, technical engineering prowess or practice, and to return to our earlier 275 
discourse, most certainly over the health, safety and wellbeing of his workforce. 276 
 277 
4.0 Key Lessons from the Victorian Engineering Legacy  278 
During Victorian times civil engineers came into their own, creating some of the most 279 
challenging tunnels ever constructed, many of which are still in regular use today.  Yet their 280 
emergence as ‘Engineering Superstars’ came at something of a price.  Although these 281 
engineers still visited their sites, the demands of construction management were growing and 282 
the distractions of finance, cash flow management, the production pressures associated with 283 
commercial work driven by shareholders, and many legal wranglings both financial and 284 
geographical began to steal more and more of their time.  The distance was increasing between 285 
those who designed and planned the work and those who carried it out, the need for more and 286 
more management creating myriad distractions from the actual goals of civil engineering.  287 
Indeed despite Gooch’s desire to focus on geology and construction, as his profile grew he 288 
spent much more time in his office than outside ‘on the line’. 289 
 290 
The Victorian times arguably laid the foundations for these now-embedded structures of our 291 
industry.  The greater importance given to management, contracts and shareholders seems 292 
now to be cast in stone, at the expense of the civil engineer being an active member of the site 293 
team and an inherent part of the construction work itself.  Whether the presence on site of these 294 
Engineering Superstars would have reduced the accident statistics of the time will always of 295 
course remain speculative, but, if we look back to the Georgian engineering legacy, the 296 
message, in the case of tunnel construction at least, is that simply being there, being able to 297 
evaluate, reflect and act in-situ, can be of considerable benefit in the maintenance of worker 298 
health and safety. 299 
 300 
For although the Victorian times brought the first explicit acknowledgement of worker welfare in 301 
the form of the Health and Morals of Apprentices Act 1802, this was not something that 302 
benefitted construction workers, particularly the railway Navvies.  Despite the establishment of 303 
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sick funds, these were paid for by the workers and not the company management.  Despite 304 
public statements of the desire to invest time and money in making the work safe, a 305 
considerable number of lives were so regularly lost that records of who and when and why 306 
simply do not exist from the time.  The ‘railway mania’ of the mid C.19 saw the first boom in 307 
commercial rather than municipal construction projects, and the vast sums of money that could 308 
be made from such ventures left construction management and worker wellbeing as low 309 
priorities.  In contemporary times we are still trying to redress this (in)balance between money 310 
and people: the construction and civil engineering industry now pro-actively seeking to prioritise 311 
and ensure the health and safety of the workforce.  Whilst things are certainly different today, 312 
and there have been considerable improvements in our injury statistics, we must recognise that 313 
we are still struggling to escape the Victorian legacy that clearly positioned the commerciality of 314 
construction work as a priority over the care of the workers and the habit that experienced 315 
leaders worked remote from the construction location.   316 
 317 
4.0 Conclusion 318 
The Victorian legacy is one that set many of the foundation stones in the history of civil 319 
engineering as a profession.  Its exploration is able to reveal the various management 320 
challenges placed on the engineering celebrities of the time as they contributed to a most 321 
turbulent industrial era, and one in which profit quickly established itself as the driving force 322 
behind many civil engineering projects.  And these are challenges that remain today, and should 323 
be clearly acknowledged.  Time and money remain industry priorities, and Victorian times are 324 
able to clearly demonstrate how detrimental their influence on worker wellbeing can be.  The 325 
distractions of management placed on civil engineers during Victorian times are clear, and this 326 
legacy is one that has certainly endured.  Indeed, the emphasis on management and leadership 327 
over technical excellence and operational involvement within the civil engineering profession 328 
remains a subject of contemporary debate within the ICE itself.  Whether management of 329 
projects, contractually, legally and financially, is actually worthy of professional prioritisation, 330 
when its negative consequences can be so severe, is a challenge that clearly remains.  We 331 
must recognise that perhaps the civil engineering profession should look more to the sites, to 332 
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the ground conditions and to the construction work itself, in order to ensure good tunnelling 333 
operations in practice. 334 
 335 
The Victorians are often held up as giants in civil engineering, able to build, span and tunnel in 336 
ways that had never been seen before, and which still provide much of our contemporary 337 
infrastructure.  Yet they are also able to reveal more nuanced contributions to our 338 
understandings of practice, and these should be duly recognised and consciously re-balanced if 339 
we are to take the next steps to improve  tunnelling operations within the profession of civil 340 
engineering today. 341 
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Figure 1.  Table of Victoria British Railway Tunnels over 2 mile in Length (Blower, 1964) 393 
BOX 1: A Retrospective Account of Work Progressing at Watford Tunnel Appearing in 394 
Household Words (1856) 395 
Figure 2: Watford Tunnel Face (image courtesy of the Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE)) 396 
Figure 3 – Summitt Tunnel on the Manchester to Leeds Line 1844 (image courtesy of the 397 
Science and Society Picture Library) 398 
Figure 4: Longitudinal Section of the Box Tunnel 399 
Figure 5:  Grave Stone of John Smith, Kirby Lonsdale Church.  400 
BOX 2:  Blechingley Tunnel Sick Fund Rules and Regulations Reproduced from Simms (1844 p 401 
170-171). (Image courtesy of the Institution of Civil Engineers) 402 
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